WEBVTT 00:06.580 --> 00:15.860 Welcome back to Radio Rothbard. I'm Ryan McMacon with the Mises Institute with me as my co-host though Bishop and also joining us this week is 00:16.760 --> 00:22.540 Zachary Yoast our foreign policy guy because this is our once a month foreign policy episode and 00:23.200 --> 00:31.460 We're gonna talk about this week a book that came out in 2024. It's called the sources of Russian aggression 00:32.420 --> 00:38.140 Now I suppose if you're a real Russo file this this title might seem unfair 00:39.080 --> 00:42.340 To color the the Russians aggressive 00:42.340 --> 00:47.840 But the but the fact is I really like this book because it's so even-handed and really tries to understand 00:48.420 --> 00:51.100 Why Russians respond well why Moscow? 00:51.500 --> 00:53.520 I mean obviously it should always be understood that in our discussion 00:53.520 --> 00:59.900 We're talking about regimes not about like the average American or average Russian why Moscow responds the way it does 01:00.420 --> 01:08.620 To certain actions on the part of NATO or other countries that impact on a Russian the sense of national security 01:08.620 --> 01:11.280 Or it's near abroad any of that stuff 01:12.720 --> 01:15.920 So we're gonna look at this book in a little bit of detail 01:16.900 --> 01:20.200 First I just want to make sure that if you haven't already you're 01:20.200 --> 01:26.260 Subscribing to the Mises Institute's email list. You can just go to Mises.org. That's M-I-S-E-S dot 01:26.260 --> 01:33.740 O-R-G and at the top click on subscribe. 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We've got a great year-end deal 02:39.100 --> 02:41.220 If you become a member today 02:41.220 --> 02:48.400 You can get a copy of Tom DeLorenzo's the axis of evil the three worst presidents in American history 02:49.680 --> 02:50.440 and 02:50.440 --> 02:55.440 Or if you're a current member want to not want want to reinvest for the year ahead 02:55.440 --> 02:59.000 Can you can do that at Mises.org slash radio Rothbard 24? 02:59.900 --> 03:06.920 Also worth noting that we have a very exciting new book out there from Ralph Raco 03:07.520 --> 03:11.380 Edited by Ed Fuller the world at war 03:12.260 --> 03:16.180 Which is a very exciting new book. You can get that at the Mises store 03:16.780 --> 03:23.180 Also a free copy is available online and while you're at the Mises store still time to get your Mises store shopping 03:23.180 --> 03:27.820 Done in time for the holidays and I even saw we just released a new 03:27.820 --> 03:34.040 Murray Christmas Murray Rothbard ugly Christmas sweater, which I look forward to seeing Ryan in in the future 03:34.040 --> 03:36.580 So get all of this a lot of great deals to me 03:36.580 --> 03:42.920 You know where it's right at at the Mises store again this week is still time to get your orders in 03:42.920 --> 03:44.200 prior to 03:44.200 --> 03:45.800 Christmas time 03:47.440 --> 03:48.400 alright, well 03:49.040 --> 03:51.040 let's talk about this book and 03:52.080 --> 03:57.220 Well, you know to get started. I mean always the question is well, why should I care about this book? 03:57.340 --> 04:00.640 Who wrote this book at least I don't know I look I like to 04:01.540 --> 04:04.240 Where whereas I don't require that someone has a PhD in something 04:04.240 --> 04:06.380 I'd like to know that they have some experience in the topic 04:06.380 --> 04:13.140 So Zach tell us a little bit about the author and how you discovered this book because this was Zach's idea was to read this book 04:13.140 --> 04:17.100 So I should note that should this book sound terrible in a waste of time 04:17.100 --> 04:21.180 I blame you but we'll we'll know we'll know in 35 minutes or so 04:21.180 --> 04:26.060 But yeah, tell us what kind of the origins of this book are. Yeah, sure. So the author is 04:26.620 --> 04:32.860 Dr. Sumatra Mitra and this the book is based on his recent PhD dissertation 04:33.800 --> 04:42.180 Which was at a university in the UK. I can't recall which one but he is now based in America and he's the 04:43.240 --> 04:47.660 He's the director of research and outreach at the American Ideas Institute 04:47.660 --> 04:52.400 Which is sort of the nonprofit that runs the American conservative, which you've probably 04:52.400 --> 04:58.420 Read if you're listening to this show and he frequently writes for that. He's very involved in foreign policy 04:59.680 --> 05:04.160 We're sort of friendly acquaintances on social media. We've met before and 05:05.900 --> 05:07.300 He's you know 05:08.160 --> 05:11.680 someone to follow to get a pulse on where sort of the 05:12.740 --> 05:19.260 New Republican Party is headed one might say in terms of pushing for a foreign policy of realism and restraint 05:19.260 --> 05:21.940 And this book is obviously very timely 05:22.580 --> 05:28.980 Events did catch up. It does not really talk about the invasion that began in 2022 05:30.720 --> 05:36.300 But it talks about the events before that and as he says in the introduction 05:36.300 --> 05:39.040 It's like oh look at this invasion happened 05:39.040 --> 05:47.160 but it doesn't really change anything I've said and I think it all of his arguments that he lays out make perfect sense for 05:47.160 --> 05:52.180 Understanding what rush has been doing, you know previously and now 05:53.060 --> 05:58.000 So it's it's also short. It's 180 pages. So not not too strenuous 05:58.000 --> 06:05.560 Oh, and very generously he sent us a PDF copy of the book that we will be posting in the show notes 06:05.560 --> 06:10.880 So you can read it for free because it is sort of if you want it in physical form 06:10.880 --> 06:13.940 It's a rather pricey university press book, but 06:14.460 --> 06:23.200 You know exclusive here radio Rothbard listeners you get a free PDF. So he wants people to read it and you should 06:23.840 --> 06:28.240 Well, let's talk about the there's the basic setup of the book because 06:28.240 --> 06:33.440 This is just like even if you're not particularly interested in the theory aspect of the book 06:33.440 --> 06:35.550 it's got a lot of great history in here on 06:36.680 --> 06:43.040 What occurred over the last 20 years or so well really the last 30 years in terms of Russian NATO 06:43.760 --> 06:50.460 Relations and all of those little steps that led to where we are today in terms of NATO Russian relations 06:50.460 --> 06:51.920 And if you're younger 06:53.320 --> 07:01.960 Say you're a 30 year under you won't even remember some of these things like the 2008 Russia Georgia War 07:02.680 --> 07:07.960 which you know, you're a little boy say if you were if you're much younger than me in 2008 and 07:09.260 --> 07:12.620 That's just like that's gonna be news to you that this was a whole thing 07:13.580 --> 07:19.460 Unless you've of course already researched the topic. So just lots of good history in here 07:19.460 --> 07:26.480 But also if you're interested in the various theories of international relations lots of great introductory stuff here 07:26.480 --> 07:31.930 in fact what struck me I liked about this book was some great summaries of realism and 07:32.700 --> 07:34.460 what it is and 07:34.460 --> 07:37.490 realism being the school of international relations and 07:38.570 --> 07:43.250 I just really enjoyed that part of it's a nice recapitulation of what realism is and how it 07:43.870 --> 07:48.030 It applies the situation now. So I guess we should just say what is his general thesis here 07:48.570 --> 07:52.810 I think his general thesis as far as I can tell I think it's pretty clearly stated is 07:53.630 --> 08:01.110 That Russia is a realist power and that Russian behavior over the last 30 years is generally conforms to 08:02.610 --> 08:03.810 Theories of realism 08:04.810 --> 08:10.210 Especially balancing theory the idea that when you have a very strong world power 08:10.890 --> 08:14.210 That is the United States and its allies through NATO 08:14.930 --> 08:20.570 That other powers not not not necessarily small countries, but other powers 08:20.570 --> 08:26.370 So other large countries that have real power and it could be classified as a world power 08:27.730 --> 08:33.970 Russia China especially I don't know if we could really if there's any others on that list to that extent 08:33.970 --> 08:38.850 but that those other powers are going to balance against the dominant power and 08:39.330 --> 08:46.950 So the idea here is that pretty much everything that Russia has done over the last 30 years can be explained in terms of its 08:46.950 --> 08:48.830 attempts to balance against 08:49.930 --> 08:52.590 US power in the international 08:53.370 --> 08:59.950 Sphere and he so he does a lot of work here to disabuse us from other theories about 08:59.950 --> 09:07.130 Russian aggression right? Oh, it's because the Russians have all of these dreams of being some sort of 09:07.130 --> 09:09.470 Eastern Orthodox power or 09:10.410 --> 09:13.150 Russians are just naturally aggressive or 09:14.110 --> 09:19.710 Russians are trying to reestablish the Soviet Union and on top of that he also talks about 09:20.230 --> 09:24.250 Specifically he says that Russia in this case is a defensive realist power 09:24.250 --> 09:32.250 Even in that Russia is trying to do the least amount of aggression it can get away with while still a 09:32.250 --> 09:33.010 rebuffing 09:33.710 --> 09:35.970 American and NATO attempts to 09:36.710 --> 09:42.070 Project power right up to Russian borders or into Russia's near abroad and 09:42.670 --> 09:49.690 To really expand NATO into Russia's backyard and front yard basically in that Russia will do what it can then 09:49.710 --> 09:55.150 To rebuff those attempts at growing NATO power and then return to the status quo 09:55.750 --> 10:00.770 Rather than what we hear right the US where Russia is just going to keep expanding all the way to Vienna 10:00.770 --> 10:04.110 And then Berlin and then maybe even Paris if we don't stop them 10:05.350 --> 10:07.410 Mitra here basically says well, that's insane 10:07.410 --> 10:14.590 There's there's absolutely nothing about Russia's behavior in decades that would suggest that it's doing that and then of course 10:14.590 --> 10:21.290 Mirsheimer has noted and we've noted here Russia does it in its wildest dreams doesn't even have the ability to do such a thing 10:21.290 --> 10:23.270 Get alone really have designs on 10:24.250 --> 10:27.550 Such a plan so this book goes into a lot of details 10:28.230 --> 10:35.150 But before we go is there I mean can you give us a little bit more of a rundown on 10:35.150 --> 10:42.270 Just real quick on some of the other underlying issues since since he's really trying to promote here the idea that Russia is a 10:42.270 --> 10:44.290 realist power and 10:44.290 --> 10:45.830 that it adheres to 10:46.370 --> 10:47.850 basically structuralist 10:48.590 --> 10:49.110 Motivations 10:49.650 --> 10:55.630 Can you just kind of expand on that a little bit because I feel like I haven't really done enough to really explain that sure 10:55.630 --> 11:00.510 Yes, this is something I've been thinking about a lot because as I mentioned before we started the show 11:00.510 --> 11:06.070 I just read a book called an unwritten future by Jonathan Kirchner 11:06.070 --> 11:13.490 And that book is a classical realist argument. So I've been thinking a lot about sort of the 11:14.810 --> 11:22.630 Epistemological methodology behind these various theories because I was reading them both. It's sort of the same time and they're they're rather contrasting 11:22.630 --> 11:24.450 So sort of the whole 11:25.010 --> 11:28.250 Point of structural realism. It's also called neo realism 11:30.630 --> 11:38.730 It was sort of first formulated by Kenneth Waltz and it's you know expanded on since then but 11:38.730 --> 11:44.570 The argument in short is that the structure of the international system 11:45.210 --> 11:46.010 sort of 11:46.570 --> 11:48.050 boxes states in 11:48.570 --> 11:54.590 To behaving in certain ways that can be predicted and this is not to say 11:55.170 --> 11:58.710 That this is like praxeology where this is sort of 11:59.410 --> 12:02.310 result of logical deduction. This is 12:03.250 --> 12:06.310 You know under Mises's own form of epistemology 12:06.310 --> 12:10.210 This is ultimately a form of history where we study history to then 12:11.470 --> 12:12.190 draw 12:14.110 --> 12:15.550 conclusions on 12:15.550 --> 12:20.570 What seems to be cause and effect so even John Mirsheimer the most, you know 12:20.570 --> 12:26.030 Ardent defender of structural realism in his specific brand is called offensive realism 12:26.030 --> 12:29.070 Whereas mitra's promoting more defensive realism 12:29.930 --> 12:37.690 He acknowledges that states do not always act in the way that realism would predict that they would act 12:38.270 --> 12:39.010 so 12:40.010 --> 12:46.790 Mitra in the beginning is contrasting realism with basically liberalism and constructivism and 12:47.550 --> 12:49.370 their methods of trying to 12:50.310 --> 12:50.710 understand 12:51.750 --> 12:58.790 Why state one how states act and why they act how they do and I mean 12:58.790 --> 13:06.330 It's this is a quite a simplification, but I mean liberalism and constructivism basically as you are alluding to it's like the Russians are evil 13:06.330 --> 13:14.170 They want to reestablish the Soviet Union. They want to build this orthodox civilization. There's another school of thought called 13:16.030 --> 13:22.070 Eurasianism which if you've heard of a Dugan, that's his school of thought and people are my Dugan the whisperer 13:23.010 --> 13:25.130 in the Kremlin but 13:26.530 --> 13:28.170 Structural realism I 13:29.350 --> 13:37.250 like a lot because it is it is necessarily a simplification of 13:38.090 --> 13:45.410 Very complicated phenomena and this is a problem. I have with classical realism. It's classical realism 13:46.190 --> 13:50.630 basically, you know at least Kirchner here in this book is like oh 13:51.630 --> 13:56.330 The the world's much more complicated than you say it is structural realists 13:56.330 --> 14:02.210 But the structural realists would return and say it yes, we acknowledge it's so complicated 14:02.210 --> 14:10.050 Which is why we have to try and distill things down to simplify things so that we can then 14:10.760 --> 14:16.470 formulate and plan how to act in the future and I would say that this aligns a lot with 14:17.530 --> 14:22.470 Muses is epistemology that one can find in theory and history and 14:24.130 --> 14:26.470 epistemological problems of economics, I believe 14:27.750 --> 14:29.350 So that's sort of the 14:30.130 --> 14:37.670 Epistemological level and then there are five foundational assumptions of real structural realism that I can't name off the top of my head 14:37.670 --> 14:39.690 but two of the biggest ones are 14:40.690 --> 14:44.790 We live in a state of the international system is a system of anarchy 14:44.790 --> 14:49.670 You can't call the police if Russia's invading to come and help you 14:49.670 --> 14:55.710 Whereas in most places, you know in the u.s. You can call the police and someone will probably show up eventually 14:55.710 --> 15:03.250 The other really crucial thing is that the future is radically uncertain. We can never understand 15:04.290 --> 15:08.690 Truly the intentions of other states and that combined with the other ones 15:08.690 --> 15:13.670 I can't name off the top of my head box people into this structure that incentivizes 15:13.670 --> 15:19.650 the leaders of states to behave in certain ways and so we're taking that framework and 15:19.670 --> 15:23.670 He's saying here's what defensive realism would predict Russia would do 15:23.670 --> 15:30.390 If it was a defensive realist and then he looks at three case studies. He looks at NATO expansion 15:30.950 --> 15:37.910 He looks at Ukraine and he looks at Georgia and he says the evidence is they behave 15:37.910 --> 15:41.630 How you know a defensive realist would predict they behave 15:41.630 --> 15:46.750 So that's that's more or less the nutshell of the book and I would note that Rothbard generally presents 15:47.650 --> 15:48.810 Uses a lot of these 15:50.430 --> 15:56.030 Inexplicitly that is he doesn't really ever say hey, I'm a realist, but clearly in his theory of the state 15:56.670 --> 16:01.330 When it comes to wars here, he's functioning under two assumptions which fit very well in realism 16:01.330 --> 16:08.670 One is that states act to preserve themselves above all else and this is the primary concern of states 16:08.670 --> 16:10.830 they don't want to be destroyed and 16:10.830 --> 16:16.710 So they will assert themselves whenever they think their interest especially their survival is threatened 16:16.710 --> 16:22.830 And then another important aspect of it is that decisions are primarily almost overwhelmingly made by elites, right? 16:23.170 --> 16:29.670 There are yes, there are limits on state power that occur through a variety of political processes domestically 16:29.670 --> 16:33.550 but a lot of that is in the realist view basically irrelevant and 16:34.110 --> 16:41.010 That what matters is especially since so much a foreign policy decision making in a place like the United States 16:41.010 --> 16:44.170 But also most other Western quote-unquote democracies 16:44.710 --> 16:50.830 The the democratic process is cut out of the foreign making a foreign policy decision-making process all of this secrecy 16:50.830 --> 16:52.910 It's all designed to make it undemocratic 16:53.470 --> 16:55.550 And so it's elites making these decisions 16:55.550 --> 17:02.070 so it's an elite driven process designed to preserve the state and state interests and that those are realist 17:02.070 --> 17:05.650 assumptions and also Rothbard's assumptions that I think just kind of our 17:06.290 --> 17:13.930 Mises Institute assumption about how states function in the international sphere. So once we got all of that thinking 17:14.710 --> 17:16.270 Let's look at some of the history, right? 17:16.390 --> 17:22.730 What's what's the deal with all of this stuff going on between NATO the US and Russia over the past 30 years now? 17:22.890 --> 17:29.990 Of course, you may remember that the Soviet Union ended. I believe it was on Christmas Day in 17:30.730 --> 17:31.210 1991 17:32.730 --> 17:34.890 Where just as its last act 17:36.710 --> 17:40.090 Gorbachev resigned and then a little while later 17:40.090 --> 17:45.330 They lowered the Soviet flag for the last time and then raised the Russian flag. So keep that period 17:45.330 --> 17:48.950 We're talking more than 30 years ago. They were very early 1990s 17:48.950 --> 17:55.150 And so at that point we're talking about Russian foreign policy and this goes through all that history. So for the first 17:56.370 --> 17:59.990 Eight years or so you get Yeltsin and Yeltsin, of course 18:00.810 --> 18:07.710 having inherited a very weak and impoverished Russia in the wake of the implosion of the Soviet Union 18:08.350 --> 18:11.290 Is doing his best to get along with the West 18:11.290 --> 18:16.090 There was very little Russia could do in terms of asserting itself and its own it had nukes 18:16.090 --> 18:22.270 But that was really its only method of asserting any independence from the West and what the West wanted out of Russia 18:22.270 --> 18:24.530 but then by the late 90s 18:24.530 --> 18:32.850 1999 you get Putin come in and Putin had the support of a large number of Russian elites including much of the civilian public 18:32.850 --> 18:38.670 that wanted to really make sure that Russia maintained its status as a 18:38.670 --> 18:43.530 Great power that it wasn't just being pushed around by the United States and just basic 18:43.530 --> 18:51.010 Nationalism that most countries adhere to what made Russia different was that Russia had actually the ability to assert some 18:51.010 --> 18:53.570 independence that most countries do not and 18:54.530 --> 18:58.450 Being a great power it could then pursue in this book 18:59.150 --> 19:00.590 as explained by Mitra 19:01.150 --> 19:07.070 Russia could then assert itself as a great power to really balance against the United States. That is that's another key 19:07.830 --> 19:09.270 theory here is that 19:10.070 --> 19:17.110 You get all of these other countries and they're gonna join up together to try and balance against the dominant power 19:17.930 --> 19:20.810 So Russia's gonna try and get other countries to join it 19:20.810 --> 19:24.770 It's going to do what it can to get along with countries necessary to 19:25.750 --> 19:27.570 diminish total relative 19:27.570 --> 19:34.770 US power and that's really the story of the last 30 years in this theory and what Mitra is talking about and it begins 19:34.770 --> 19:38.290 Then with the NATO expansion then in the early 90s 19:38.290 --> 19:43.190 So as the Soviet Union implodes the Warsaw Paxises do exist and then really the first 19:43.770 --> 19:48.950 The first conflict really was over the unification of Germany. So it's 19:48.950 --> 19:51.910 With Germany wants to unite. So what do you think of that Russia? 19:51.910 --> 19:57.410 I'm like, well, you know, we split up German we split Germany up for a reason because we being the Russians 19:58.230 --> 20:01.590 Germany has been a problem for us historically and 20:02.470 --> 20:06.550 So they finally agreed to it and it's well documented here in this book 20:06.550 --> 20:12.530 They agreed to it after NATO and a whole bunch of Western leaders John Major in Britain 20:13.490 --> 20:15.210 the US President 20:15.830 --> 20:20.910 And his of course various servants the germ the West German leaders are all saying, okay 20:20.910 --> 20:24.830 We are not going to move NATO East beyond East Germany 20:24.830 --> 20:29.450 So East Germany will come into Germany into West Germany. It'll become a NATO country 20:29.450 --> 20:35.310 But we're not gonna move one inch East was the promise. There's a lot of debate in the last couple of years 20:35.310 --> 20:41.270 Oh, did NATO ever promise that it's clear that they said that that they weren't going to move it east now 20:41.270 --> 20:44.830 Mitra says, well, it's possible that you could have interpreted that differently 20:45.390 --> 20:47.770 It wasn't like to the level of a treaty 20:47.770 --> 20:54.050 But it's pretty clear that the West was promising to not move NATO East and then on top of that 20:54.050 --> 21:02.110 They these Western leaders were very explicitly promising to not move military material into farther East points 21:02.110 --> 21:05.710 So a few years later what they're saying is okay Poland 21:06.410 --> 21:11.470 Wants to join NATO can Poland join NATO and Russia said well, I don't know 21:11.470 --> 21:14.610 That doesn't seem like great idea and they're like well 21:14.610 --> 21:20.530 We promise Russia to not move any like US missiles or any US arms into Poland 21:20.530 --> 21:24.110 Though it'll just be a defensive thing to help Poland feel better and the Russia say, okay 21:24.110 --> 21:27.470 Fine, you can do that and then of course a few years later 21:27.470 --> 21:34.230 Then the US starts moving weapons into Poland and you see this pattern repeated again and again now 21:34.790 --> 21:40.730 If you said this in 2022, you were just parroting Russian propaganda, but these are all just facts 21:40.730 --> 21:43.950 these are all just historical facts that as 21:45.230 --> 21:51.290 NATO made promises that they weren't going to be provocative to the Russians then they just kept moving material east 21:51.290 --> 21:54.950 They kept expanding NATO East in spite of initial promises 21:54.950 --> 22:02.930 And so the threat kept moving east and then you had a situation where okay, George W. Bush after 911 22:02.930 --> 22:04.370 There was like sort of a 22:05.370 --> 22:08.750 Approachment a renaissance in US-Russian relations after 9-11 22:08.750 --> 22:14.490 Russia was willing to ally with the US to fight terrorism because of course Russia has a problem with that also 22:15.630 --> 22:18.770 And so George W. Bush was reframing NATO as sort of this 22:19.770 --> 22:26.370 Western political alliance to help us fight global terror etc. said Russia said okay, we can get on board with that, but then 22:27.670 --> 22:32.010 NATO starts doing all these flyovers and patrols in the Baltic 22:32.010 --> 22:38.070 Which then is a new provocative situation and then Russia starts to become very defensive again 22:38.070 --> 22:40.810 So it's just over and over again 22:40.810 --> 22:48.190 These these NATO attempts to move east to really project power further and further east and then they invite 22:48.190 --> 22:51.850 George they start grooming Georgia to become a NATO member and 22:53.370 --> 22:58.470 Then the Russians really freak out with that and I think that's where the narrative really picks up here in the book 22:58.470 --> 23:01.070 Is when he starts talking about the example of Georgia 23:01.710 --> 23:05.890 And how this was really a the first case in a long time 23:05.890 --> 23:10.070 Certainly for Russia where they actually had a real military operation 23:10.790 --> 23:12.350 against a 23:12.350 --> 23:13.310 neighboring country 23:13.910 --> 23:21.390 Although it was a very very limited invasion, but it was a war and it was a well anybody would recognize as a real war and had a 23:21.390 --> 23:23.450 set end date and 23:23.450 --> 23:29.410 And that's when we start to see some of these new patterns emerge where Russia was no longer just threatening and expressing 23:29.930 --> 23:37.530 Displeasure, but it was willing to take real military action against a neighboring country that was looking to invite NATO right up to the borders of 23:38.610 --> 23:45.410 Russian territory and I think that's where the the the accelerated narrative really begins here 23:45.410 --> 23:48.550 Yeah, and I think it might be helpful to note 23:50.410 --> 23:54.810 When we say like that there's a threat moving towards Russia 23:55.970 --> 23:59.350 This I think it's sort of important to emphasize that 23:59.410 --> 24:00.570 because so many people 24:01.250 --> 24:04.190 sort of in the mainstream foreign policy bloc will say 24:04.190 --> 24:10.890 Well, we're not threatening Russia at all. Russia's overreacting. They're you know, we're just friendly and nice and 24:12.370 --> 24:20.390 This is why you have to I mean realism is very generally better at this at putting yourself in the shoes of someone else 24:21.030 --> 24:24.330 And you have to look you know going back to the 90s 24:24.330 --> 24:29.250 The 90s were horrible for Russia, you know, Soviet Union collapsed 24:30.090 --> 24:37.770 it was just wild and crazy crime and everything through the roof the Chechen war all sorts of madness and 24:38.930 --> 24:41.050 so Russia was extremely weak and 24:43.350 --> 24:51.510 This allowed the West and NATO to keep expanding because what was Russia going to do about it? They're a giant mess and 24:53.730 --> 24:54.850 In the 24:55.530 --> 25:03.270 2000s Russia more and more got its act together and this is partly why Putin's popular because he came in and sort of ended the chaos and 25:04.410 --> 25:09.450 Just I mean Mitra doesn't get into this a ton, but just to give an idea of why 25:11.090 --> 25:12.750 Russia might fear 25:12.750 --> 25:15.670 NATO and the West on the one hand 25:15.670 --> 25:21.830 It's just you can never really truly understand what another power is thinking or planning on doing 25:21.830 --> 25:27.510 But there's lots of dangerous rhetoric and he does touch on the color revolutions which happened in Ukraine 25:28.470 --> 25:35.810 And Russia reacts to that and in Georgia and Russia reacts to that and they fear that that will happen to them 25:37.090 --> 25:37.610 but 25:38.850 --> 25:45.950 There is a lot of rhetoric usually from the people who say Russia has nothing to fear which is quite ironic 25:45.950 --> 25:49.910 Saying crazy things like we should break Russia up 25:51.090 --> 25:57.690 And in even years ago way back when I was in DC, this was probably in 2016 I attended an event 25:58.290 --> 26:05.950 Where there was some general or something who had been involved in sort of like arms control with you know 26:05.950 --> 26:11.050 Post-soviet Russia and he'd gone to Russia to you know look at their arsenal and things 26:11.050 --> 26:16.330 And I was so I was flabbergasted when he randomly said yeah in the 90s 26:16.330 --> 26:18.910 we probably should have just gone in and 26:19.830 --> 26:23.910 Taken the Russian nuclear arsenal away from them. I 26:23.910 --> 26:27.170 Mean that I was like what that's sort of crazy talk 26:27.170 --> 26:30.450 But if you're a Russian how does how would you react to that? 26:30.770 --> 26:34.270 It's like well they want to take away our ace in the hole 26:34.270 --> 26:39.630 You know to defend ourselves and they think they want to you know, they say they want to break our country up 26:39.630 --> 26:44.250 They say you know, we're backwards and have the wrong values and need new values 26:44.250 --> 26:51.730 You know, I mean look look at what happened to Iraq, you know this sort of nation-building sort of 26:51.730 --> 26:58.830 Thing so if this is what we're talking about when we say that the Russians view this as a threat 26:58.830 --> 27:06.590 It's not this is not crazy talk and in the case of Russia, especially as Mitra points out since the 11th century 27:06.590 --> 27:12.800 They've been you know subject to numerous invasions from hither thither and yawn and 27:14.050 --> 27:16.830 That's always, you know horrible World War two 27:17.520 --> 27:19.590 27 million Soviets were killed 27:20.290 --> 27:24.510 Obviously which Russians were a big chunk of that so it's 27:25.430 --> 27:28.150 This isn't just sort of paranoia 27:28.150 --> 27:32.010 I would emphasize and I think it's also interesting that with of that Georgia example 27:32.970 --> 27:38.810 You know the document in the book how Russia was kind of unprepared for that conflict 27:38.810 --> 27:42.050 At the extent to which that you know 27:42.050 --> 27:48.210 And it's kind of the classic playbook which we saw play out in the can the lead up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine 27:48.770 --> 27:54.810 Is that you have an aspect of you know protecting ethnic minorities in the case of Georgia, of course it is 27:54.810 --> 27:56.690 you have the ascetians 27:57.590 --> 27:58.810 you have the 27:58.810 --> 28:00.850 the other ethnic 28:01.650 --> 28:02.950 minority that are 28:03.570 --> 28:04.490 such than a 28:04.490 --> 28:09.050 Yeah, and they you know you have how 28:09.610 --> 28:16.190 You would you have those sort of of minority ethnic conflicts that obviously Russia has a fear of 28:16.190 --> 28:21.470 Seperous movements within their own territory, but you start have that building tension that you have 28:22.410 --> 28:24.210 Activists you have leaders within those groups 28:25.010 --> 28:32.110 antagonizing wanting to escalate things and the extent to which in if Georgia is sort of the the original playground for 28:33.110 --> 28:35.490 modern Russian, you know military 28:36.790 --> 28:40.870 Adventurism from kind of Western perspective the extent by which Russia was cut off guard 28:40.870 --> 28:44.810 I mean even document how like a lot of the senior military officials were vacationing because like it was the 28:44.810 --> 28:50.130 Vacation season Russia now Putin was actually in the you know visiting the Olympics in Beijing in 2008 28:50.130 --> 28:51.390 So this was not a 28:52.030 --> 28:55.270 And I think they kind of well accepted history at this point 28:55.270 --> 28:58.170 You know though you always have fine people that can argue up about these points, right? 28:58.250 --> 29:03.690 But like the the aggression within that conflict was originated by the Georgian government and 29:04.570 --> 29:07.270 And it's interesting means like that that's one example right now that you know 29:07.270 --> 29:09.910 It gets a lot less headlines and the hot war that's going on Ukraine 29:09.910 --> 29:17.750 But this dynamic of color revolutions of the rule of NGOs this entire different dynamic separate went in terms of 29:17.750 --> 29:24.710 Softpower influences both from the West and from Russia like it is worth noting right you know the extent to which Russia subsidizes green parties in Europe 29:25.190 --> 29:26.690 You know they you know 29:26.690 --> 29:32.410 I was kind of you know get amused when your people that are are Russia defenders within the West right try to uphold 29:32.410 --> 29:36.250 You know Russia some sort of great defender of conservative values and that sort of stuff like no 29:36.250 --> 29:38.210 Like if you see that the propaganda they put outwards 29:38.210 --> 29:40.650 It's very much kind of a left-wing bend kind disruptive there 29:40.650 --> 29:47.150 But but you know if that as the original sort of conflict that shapes the Western's view of Russia 29:47.150 --> 29:51.390 This was something that Russia was kind of dragged into in terms of the hot war aspect of it 29:51.390 --> 29:55.310 I'm which is an aspect of that conflict that yeah, I was familiar with that conflict 29:55.310 --> 29:57.470 I know some friends from Russia, but I'm in Georgia 29:57.470 --> 30:03.530 But I was I did not realize that aspect of that history to that extent which I think is very fascinating in terms in our Western 30:03.530 --> 30:05.330 perception of 30:05.330 --> 30:10.530 Modern Russian foreign policy. Yeah, that's a point Mitra makes is that the war 30:10.530 --> 30:15.970 Was really bad for Georgia because Georgia ended up looking like the aggressor 30:15.970 --> 30:19.170 In that case and and made itself as Mitra notes 30:19.170 --> 30:25.850 the Georgians made themselves to look like an unreliable partner that they kind of just like went off half-cocked and 30:25.850 --> 30:31.990 We're animated by some bonkers ideas about asserting themselves in the region 30:31.990 --> 30:35.510 And it was really bad for them because it's not even 30:36.790 --> 30:40.070 Controversial to say that the Georgians essentially started that war 30:40.730 --> 30:45.170 Because that's just the reality and yeah as you know the Russians were caught off guard 30:45.170 --> 30:48.790 And but a Mitra and let's let's kind of move on to that topic of is 30:49.610 --> 30:52.910 Russia a status quo power or not and that's really the 30:52.910 --> 30:58.210 The point that Mitra tries to make here is and I think that's the overriding 30:58.210 --> 30:59.930 Theme of the book 31:00.750 --> 31:03.930 We could of course go on a lot of great details here historically 31:03.930 --> 31:08.190 But I think the overriding theme is that yes, Russia is a 31:08.790 --> 31:14.990 defensive realist power and it's it would prefer to be a status quo power and and return 31:15.170 --> 31:19.890 to being status quo whenever it can and Georgia was a great example 31:19.890 --> 31:22.110 It notes how yep the Russians were caught off guard 31:22.110 --> 31:29.810 But then when they finally got their act together militarily and started asserting themselves in the conflict and really took control of 31:29.810 --> 31:32.090 South Ossetia that 31:32.610 --> 31:38.090 They they then returned to that as quickly as they could return to 31:38.090 --> 31:41.970 Just a a peaceful situation as fast as they could okay 31:41.970 --> 31:49.730 We've stationed some troops in South Ossetia. We're now de facto rulers of South Ossetia and also in Akhazia 31:50.550 --> 31:54.110 Which I think is I would have said over on the western coast of Georgia 31:56.950 --> 32:02.230 Where that's also occupied by the Russians but in both cases what they're saying is okay 32:02.230 --> 32:07.510 We want these frozen conflicts where we can just go back to no conflict 32:07.510 --> 32:10.350 And we'll just leave it there and let it go 32:10.870 --> 32:14.430 Matron makes the point where they clearly we're not attempting to 32:15.110 --> 32:23.310 Decapitate the Georgian regime the Russians had no plans to occupy Georgia or to conquer Georgia and to take it over 32:23.310 --> 32:24.970 This was clearly not in the Russian 32:25.710 --> 32:29.710 Calculation and then this takes us then the next step to Crimea 32:30.910 --> 32:36.670 Where they wanted something similar where they could get a another maybe frozen conflict 32:36.670 --> 32:38.170 Although actually they take it a step further 32:40.470 --> 32:46.310 Because they they seem to really just truly annex Crimea whereas they they've never really done that with any of the Georgian 32:47.910 --> 32:50.410 Properties if you will the Georgian territories 32:51.150 --> 32:59.050 but they did try to just do piecemeal conflicts in in Ukraine and then return to as to a a 32:59.510 --> 33:04.590 Frozen conflict status quo situation as quickly as they could 33:04.590 --> 33:11.990 And especially in 2014 it was clear the Russians had no interest in conquering Ukraine or anything like that 33:12.510 --> 33:14.350 But how would you characterize? 33:15.190 --> 33:22.170 Right with it seems that clearly the Ukraine situations that is an escalation of sorts from the Georgia situation 33:22.170 --> 33:28.470 But I think still fits in with mitra's overall as he notes still fits in with his overall theory here 33:28.470 --> 33:34.170 I mean, what would you say was different about the Crimea Ukraine situation compared to the Georgia situation? 33:34.170 --> 33:39.290 Which was much more limited, right? Yeah, so the biggest difference is that Crimea is a super important 33:40.870 --> 33:42.630 Geo geostrategic location 33:43.570 --> 33:47.750 You know going back I can I'm not really up on the history 33:47.750 --> 33:52.750 But it was a big deal when Russia first acquired Crimea, you know hundreds of years ago 33:53.390 --> 33:57.590 and it's sort of how they can project power into the Black Sea and 33:58.670 --> 34:03.950 The it was it would be an extreme blow to their security 34:04.750 --> 34:06.250 ability, you know 34:07.090 --> 34:15.290 To defend themselves as they view it to lose Crimea and the idea that oh Ukraine joins NATO and now there's NATO 34:15.750 --> 34:16.090 NATO 34:17.030 --> 34:20.430 ships, you know American ships in the Sevastopol and 34:20.430 --> 34:26.710 American bombers at bases in Crimea that you know, they they would hit the roof as it were 34:26.710 --> 34:32.610 so I would say it's much more a direct strategic importance whereas 34:33.330 --> 34:37.250 Ensuring Georgia's not in NATO is important, especially for the Caucasus region 34:38.110 --> 34:38.750 they 34:39.370 --> 34:41.230 accomplished their mission of 34:41.890 --> 34:45.570 Ensuring Georgia can't get into NATO because they have this 34:46.170 --> 34:52.770 Conflict that's not resolved. So that obviously disincentivizes anyone for NATO from saying sure come on 34:52.770 --> 34:56.810 You have this, you know border conflict with a nuclear power. No worries 34:59.250 --> 35:01.270 So it was 35:02.610 --> 35:07.950 And it it gets back to so that the opposite of status quo is a revisionist power 35:07.950 --> 35:11.830 So like Germany and Japan and World War two were revisionist powers 35:11.830 --> 35:13.670 They were really trying to shake things up 35:13.670 --> 35:21.010 while as Russia was trying to preserve its power in either in the Caucasus or in Crimea via the 35:22.710 --> 35:26.230 You know power projection in the Black Sea and it was quite interesting 35:26.230 --> 35:32.050 He notes how really it worked out great for Russia. They seized basically the whole Ukrainian Navy 35:32.610 --> 35:39.570 Gained all these important bases and everything. I had not realized there were so many important military industrial 35:40.010 --> 35:41.650 manufacturing facilities and 35:43.050 --> 35:45.210 In the Eastern 35:45.850 --> 35:51.970 breakaway Ukrainian provinces which were in a similar situation to Georgia's breakaway provinces 35:51.970 --> 36:00.110 They were technically independent countries that no one but Russia recognized and when the war this the current war started 36:00.110 --> 36:10.270 They were annexed and I think that the Georgian breakaway provinces at the time were also like an excess to her or something like that, but 36:11.110 --> 36:13.690 So here I think it might be 36:14.230 --> 36:15.210 it I 36:16.230 --> 36:20.650 to bring it to analyzing the current conflict I am 36:21.350 --> 36:24.550 I'm not super sure what exactly the plan was 36:25.070 --> 36:26.110 when they 36:26.110 --> 36:27.710 launched the war 36:28.590 --> 36:33.770 similar to Georgia it it got off on quite a not-good foot in many cases and 36:34.730 --> 36:37.690 there's I but in my view a lot of 36:38.730 --> 36:42.170 Mistakes made in some of the analysis especially the 36:43.250 --> 36:46.550 What happened around Kiev Kiev? 36:48.570 --> 36:55.410 There were not you know just numerous divisions roaming around I mean I've seen some very good analysis by you know 36:55.410 --> 36:57.870 People in the military looking at 36:57.870 --> 36:59.170 Satellite footage 36:59.850 --> 37:04.650 Analyzing literally like individual fields and they're like, you know, there's obviously not you know numerous 37:05.330 --> 37:13.150 Hundreds of you know all these numerous brigades and they're just like it would be crazy to think they could they they would be nuts if they thought they could have 37:13.830 --> 37:14.390 attacked 37:15.290 --> 37:22.470 Kiev in force with the forces that we can infer were there based on all this sort of satellite evidence 37:22.470 --> 37:26.750 They have and things like that so I don't know if it was just an attempt to 37:27.790 --> 37:32.590 Spook Ukraine into doing what they wanted to be like we're we're really serious here 37:32.590 --> 37:40.150 You better listen to us if they thought that you know, they'd bribed slash had enough collaborators in 37:40.150 --> 37:42.630 Ukraine that things would just fall apart 37:43.190 --> 37:44.530 It is worth noting 37:45.330 --> 37:52.450 That the US intelligence which at the time said this invasion is gonna happen and people were like 37:52.470 --> 37:57.310 Yeah, that's you're crazy. This is warmongering. So they're right. The invasion is gonna happen 37:57.310 --> 38:03.470 But they also said yeah Ukraine will fall in about a month. It'll all be over. They're really wrong on that 38:03.470 --> 38:06.290 So potentially the Russians also thought that 38:06.290 --> 38:08.590 but the point is 38:09.790 --> 38:14.130 They're not engaging in crazy revisionism in terms of 38:15.190 --> 38:19.470 Conquering all of Ukraine. They're sort of securing the interest in Ukraine 38:19.470 --> 38:27.730 They already have and ensuring that Ukraine will not be joining NATO anytime soon. It's not really an imperialistic 38:27.730 --> 38:30.450 war of conquest if it were 38:31.770 --> 38:36.890 Well, they could be doing a lot more sort of strategic bombing and just leveling everywhere 38:38.390 --> 38:38.950 and 38:38.950 --> 38:44.870 They could be I mean, it's it's really it's a little nuts if you look at the border between Ukraine and Russia 38:44.870 --> 38:50.830 It's enormous and there's not a lot of fighting a lot or really any fighting along vast swaths of it 38:51.930 --> 38:58.430 So it is even though it's the largest war in Europe and I mean guess war since World War two probably 38:58.430 --> 39:01.750 It is still a relatively restrained conflict 39:01.750 --> 39:05.230 Whereas if they were, you know revisionist Nazi Germany 39:06.230 --> 39:09.650 It would be an all-out effort and I mean that's part of what 39:09.650 --> 39:15.310 It's been interesting the Kremlin has tried to preserve normalcy in Russia 39:16.910 --> 39:17.470 and 39:17.970 --> 39:24.110 I mean, there's lots of lots of effects on the economy that are probably going to be coming down the road where people will be 39:24.110 --> 39:25.590 Feeling a bigger hit in their wallet 39:26.250 --> 39:33.190 But they're not engaging in you know full-scale war mobilization as would be required where they just you know 39:33.190 --> 39:37.850 We're re-establishing the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 39:37.850 --> 39:44.770 Well, I think that all issue of how it's a conservative power right is trying to preserve what it had going on 39:45.910 --> 39:52.330 Mitra really shows that in as same with me. I was unaware of just how much 39:52.330 --> 39:55.030 Russia depended on southeastern Ukraine 39:55.610 --> 39:56.150 for 39:56.730 --> 40:02.570 Manufacturing for munitions creation and then of course and that's on top of the Crimea 40:03.170 --> 40:03.670 just 40:04.870 --> 40:08.090 Donetsk right the the entire Donbas is 40:08.090 --> 40:15.990 They had it was just absolutely key and critical to Russian logistics in a variety of products and services that they wanted 40:15.990 --> 40:19.450 And so by invading they're really just trying to preserve 40:19.950 --> 40:25.390 Goods and services they already had become accustomed to having they weren't they weren't really expanding 40:26.110 --> 40:31.750 Access and influence much at all, but they were faced with losing all of that on top of Crimea 40:31.750 --> 40:36.350 Right, so you can look at the whole thing right by by invading the Donbas 40:36.350 --> 40:42.150 they're preserving access to a whole aspect of its military industrial complex as 40:42.830 --> 40:47.950 well as important access to the Sea of Azov in very important coastline and 40:48.510 --> 40:51.130 Then Crimea and then on top of that of course southern Ukraine 40:51.990 --> 40:58.110 The Russians needed to preserve water access for Ukraine, which is very dry and has no natural 40:58.790 --> 41:00.870 water sources and 41:00.870 --> 41:05.430 Ukraine had cut that off in the years leading up to the full invasion 41:05.430 --> 41:11.570 So Crimea was basically becoming dried out and was relying on water piped in from elsewhere 41:11.570 --> 41:17.670 So the the new invasion right it gives it gives total control the Sea of Azov it provides water to Crimea 41:17.670 --> 41:24.410 And it provides access to all of this absolutely essential economic stuff in southeast Ukraine all of which Mitra notes and 41:25.110 --> 41:29.610 He answers a very important question here right and this has come up in a lot of debate over the 41:29.610 --> 41:32.010 over NATO expansion is 41:33.710 --> 41:39.130 Why did Russia respond as it did in response to Ukraine NATO meddling in Ukraine? 41:39.450 --> 41:44.450 But not to NATO expanding into Finland or in the Baltics 41:44.450 --> 41:48.030 Why did Russia respond differently to that now as you notes to some extent? 41:48.170 --> 41:51.690 It was because of Russia was really weak when they expanded to the Baltics 41:51.690 --> 41:55.190 However, when you look at just how much key and central 41:55.710 --> 42:02.970 Eastern Ukraine is to the Russian economy and Russian national interests. It's far beyond anything that is key in 42:02.970 --> 42:05.930 Finland or in other parts of Eastern Europe 42:05.930 --> 42:10.710 It's a very different situation and it keeps coming back to a phrase he repeats multiple times in the book 42:10.710 --> 42:16.870 which is that great powers balance against threats not against countries and 42:18.030 --> 42:23.610 That is I think covered in this issue here is that as the threats moved eastward 42:23.610 --> 42:24.950 Russia became 42:25.650 --> 42:26.270 more 42:27.090 --> 42:31.110 vehement about balancing against those threats and those threats 42:31.110 --> 42:37.670 Materialized in Ukraine more than anywhere else more than right expanding NATO to Finland did not 42:38.690 --> 42:46.770 Expand a threat the way expanding into Ukraine would so he's making some important distinctions there that a lot of people just kind of 42:46.770 --> 42:48.810 mockingly noted saying that oh 42:49.450 --> 42:56.870 Russia's just crazy and illogical in its expansion because it's freaking out about Ukraine, but didn't hardly do anything about Finland 42:57.670 --> 43:04.450 Okay, but that's explained here in the book and he just makes the point over and over that if we look at the details of it 43:04.450 --> 43:11.030 Russia is crazy like a fox as the phrase goes right is there there's nothing crazy about or 43:12.850 --> 43:19.650 Unexpected or irrational about Russia's response to the Ukraine situation or to the Georgia situation is very much explained 43:19.650 --> 43:26.410 By the proximity of the threat which is an important issue right he notes that the threat becomes larger the closer 43:26.410 --> 43:27.970 It gets to Russia's borders 43:28.830 --> 43:35.290 Right the US could do something in Zimbabwe and has nothing and Russia's just not even if Russia had like a lot of 43:35.790 --> 43:37.970 Interests there in terms of trade 43:38.590 --> 43:44.430 Or it had a military base there Russia is not going to respond in the to the way to things in Africa 43:44.430 --> 43:50.930 the way it would respond to things in Ukraine or Georgia which are right on Russia's borders because proximity matters and 43:51.690 --> 43:56.410 So this book is just I think a good explanation of why the war in Ukraine 43:56.410 --> 43:58.770 Why the freak out over Crimea in Georgia? 43:59.090 --> 44:05.830 We call it a freak out, but it's actually very much to be expected and makes perfect sense given the facts on the ground 44:05.830 --> 44:07.350 Yeah, and on Finland 44:07.970 --> 44:10.410 There another important contrast is 44:11.390 --> 44:17.750 Ukraine is sort of the historic highway for invading Russia. It's it's you know 44:18.610 --> 44:21.450 Does not have many geographic barriers 44:22.250 --> 44:26.730 Whereas Finland. Oh, yes, we've just added this enormous NATO border with Russia 44:27.290 --> 44:27.850 but 44:28.610 --> 44:31.200 There's not it's unlikely. There's it's 44:31.750 --> 44:32.890 people will be 44:32.890 --> 44:40.190 That Coralia, which I think is the Russian province next to Finland is going to be a highway for invading 44:40.190 --> 44:41.170 I mean you can look 44:42.230 --> 44:46.090 In in World War two when Finland rejoined the war 44:46.670 --> 44:51.930 They didn't get very far. I mean it was pretty static warfare for my, you know limited understanding 44:51.930 --> 44:55.510 I mean they were not blitzkrieg-ing down. They didn't even reach 44:55.510 --> 45:01.350 Lenin grad I mean Lenin grad was besieged, but it was still able to be reached in all that 45:03.570 --> 45:12.510 So yeah, it I think really it the book one as we were noting before it's a great introduction to sort of realist thinking and logic 45:12.510 --> 45:14.870 So, you know, it's it's worth that 45:14.870 --> 45:19.210 You know, it's worth the price of reading for that alone, but it also 45:19.730 --> 45:21.770 Gives to the idea that you know 45:22.570 --> 45:26.430 States, you know, the people the elites as you were saying they are 45:26.430 --> 45:27.370 rational 45:28.190 --> 45:34.170 And in and which there's lots of debate about what rational means and I but I think you know 45:34.170 --> 45:39.530 I like the Misesian definition of rationality. It's purposeful action and 45:40.730 --> 45:45.830 People seem to think that you know, unless you're the US or 45:46.930 --> 45:54.810 Supposedly, you know Western democracy that you just are a crazy person who is you know schizophrenically 45:55.330 --> 46:02.310 Doing things and there's all this speculation Putin's been isolated by COVID. That's why he's doing these crazy things. It's like 46:02.310 --> 46:04.530 we can we can 46:05.330 --> 46:05.890 use 46:06.710 --> 46:12.390 history to draw conclusions about cause and effect and it is not 46:13.210 --> 46:15.070 viological deduction like 46:15.610 --> 46:17.630 economics math or formal logic 46:18.290 --> 46:20.710 So it's not going to be ironclad 46:20.710 --> 46:25.630 But we can have a general idea of why people are doing things and then when he gets to the end of the book 46:25.630 --> 46:29.890 He has just a few policy recommendations, which are based on this premise of 46:29.890 --> 46:34.270 People aren't just acting like Adams randomly bouncing around 46:34.930 --> 46:37.450 They, you know states are acting 46:38.790 --> 46:46.930 Under the constraints of the international system and we therefore can say doing this will probably lead to this result 46:47.530 --> 46:51.510 And I mean people did that John McKay of John Mearsheimer 46:52.230 --> 46:56.010 famously wrote in 2014 exactly how this was going to go down and 46:56.730 --> 46:58.570 it did so I 46:59.250 --> 47:03.850 Think this is a great book intro really to realism if you're not super familiar with it 47:04.370 --> 47:09.470 But also to having a better understanding of current goings on. It's very relevant for sure 47:09.470 --> 47:14.370 Well with that we'll go ahead and wrap up this episode of radio Rothbard. Thank you, though 47:14.370 --> 47:19.530 Thank you, Zach for joining me today. Thank you everyone out there for listening and we'll see you next time