WEBVTT 00:00.020 --> 00:06.660 So today I saw an article that was posted which pointed out the fact that the surveillance 00:06.660 --> 00:13.740 stayed more or less to some degree suffered a setback, which I always like to see. 00:13.960 --> 00:15.480 Like Louis Rossman. 00:15.600 --> 00:19.780 I think I tend to focus on the bad most of the time here on this channel. 00:19.920 --> 00:24.040 And in this video I wanted to discuss the latest defeat that happened. 00:24.040 --> 00:33.760 Like after months of kind of secret legal warfare, the UK government has been forced to abandon its 00:33.760 --> 00:42.200 demand that Apple actually build a global encryption backdoor into iCloud data. 00:42.480 --> 00:50.780 And this really represents the most significant privacy victory since Apple told the FBI to go 00:50.780 --> 00:56.120 screw during the San Bernardino case way back in 2006. 00:56.640 --> 01:04.840 Now how this actually affects everything no doubt will echo far beyond just one company or one country 01:04.840 --> 01:06.480 for that matter for a while. 01:06.700 --> 01:12.280 This victory in a way, even though it's like really small, it still demonstrates that resistance 01:12.280 --> 01:13.220 actually works. 01:13.760 --> 01:23.140 That corporations can be forced to choose sides and that even surveillance states will back down 01:23.140 --> 01:26.200 when faced with determined opposition. 01:26.480 --> 01:32.060 More importantly, it shows us exactly how the next phase of the encryption wars will 01:32.060 --> 01:32.940 actually be fought. 01:33.060 --> 01:36.740 Just as a quick note, I am not pro-Apple. 01:36.740 --> 01:46.340 Like I have two laptops that are Apple computers, but I'm a Graph EOS fan all the way, 100% in, 01:46.620 --> 01:47.720 it's no doubt the way to go. 01:48.060 --> 01:54.180 The UK government demanded blanket access to end-to-end encrypted cloud data 01:54.180 --> 01:57.060 for users on a worldwide scale. 01:57.560 --> 02:05.000 They still want to build that massive surveillance infrastructure that will compromise the 02:05.000 --> 02:09.720 privacy of every iPhone user on the planet, including millions of Americans. 02:10.900 --> 02:17.360 The demand came through something called the Technical Capabilities Notice under the 02:17.360 --> 02:21.100 Investigatory Powers Act of 2016. 02:21.640 --> 02:22.540 Definitely a mouthful. 02:22.820 --> 02:27.440 Most people know this law by its nickname, which is the Snoopers Charter. 02:28.000 --> 02:29.680 And how creepy is this ship? 02:29.680 --> 02:36.220 And so the legislation passed with really minimal opposition when it did pass and it grants the 02:36.220 --> 02:41.480 UK government really sweeping powers to demand backdoors from technology companies. 02:41.920 --> 02:48.320 Now Section 217 specifically allows governmental entities to force companies to remove 02:48.320 --> 02:55.440 encryption protections and install deliberate security weakness into their actual products. 02:55.440 --> 03:01.680 So when a country does this, they are in fact telling you that you are the enemy. 03:02.000 --> 03:02.420 That's it. 03:02.480 --> 03:04.280 There's no side-stepping that. 03:04.460 --> 03:06.880 The technical details do matter here. 03:07.020 --> 03:11.440 So when the UK issued the secret order in January of 2025, 03:11.760 --> 03:18.860 they weren't asking Apple to just unlock specific devices for like specific investigations. 03:19.180 --> 03:22.820 They demanded that the company fundamentally redesign 03:22.820 --> 03:29.920 iCloud's advanced data protection feature to include a permanent governmental backdoor access, 03:30.280 --> 03:30.440 right? 03:30.820 --> 03:33.860 Like advanced data protection encrypts backups, photos, 03:34.420 --> 03:38.580 notes, and other iCloud data so that even Apple can't access it. 03:38.640 --> 03:43.780 My point is the UK government wanted that protection just eliminated globally. 03:44.220 --> 03:51.500 And in February of 2025, the company disabled advanced data protection for all new 03:51.500 --> 03:54.160 iCloud users in the UK. 03:55.060 --> 04:00.320 And this meant that British iPhone users could no longer actually access the 04:00.320 --> 04:04.760 highest level of encryption protection for their cloud-stored data. 04:05.060 --> 04:11.380 Apple appealed the order through the investigatory powers tribunal with the UK government 04:11.380 --> 04:15.540 attempting to keep the entire case secret from public scrutiny. 04:15.540 --> 04:21.820 And when that failed, the demand would have created a systemic security flaw 04:21.820 --> 04:26.420 that would have affected Apple's global infrastructure on a global level. 04:26.620 --> 04:31.000 The technical implementation would have absolutely been devastating. 04:31.320 --> 04:34.360 It would have created a backdoor for UK authorities. 04:35.080 --> 04:38.260 And I say authorities because I dislike the term authorities. 04:38.500 --> 04:42.860 For those of you that are new viewers, it's just distasteful to say. 04:42.860 --> 04:44.500 Because they're not really authorities of anyone. 04:44.880 --> 04:45.740 They're like, we're all free. 04:46.160 --> 04:47.540 And most of us are free. 04:47.920 --> 04:48.520 Moving on. 04:49.080 --> 04:52.740 Basically, this was meant as a backdoor for them. 04:53.140 --> 04:57.500 And it would have mean building in this vulnerability into the core encryption 04:57.500 --> 05:00.980 systems that actually protect all iCloud data. 05:01.460 --> 05:04.460 And there's no such thing as a backdoor that's selective 05:04.460 --> 05:07.200 or that only works for the good guys, 05:07.280 --> 05:10.120 which is the thing that governments love to try and sell. 05:10.880 --> 05:15.240 Once that weakness exists, it comes to target for criminal hackers, 05:15.680 --> 05:20.940 foreign intelligence services, and authoritarian regimes worldwide. 05:21.580 --> 05:27.460 Now, this connects directly to the pattern of government encryption attacks 05:27.460 --> 05:29.580 that we've seen in the past. 05:29.780 --> 05:33.040 Like remember the 2006 San Bernardino case, 05:33.160 --> 05:37.280 where the FBI actually demanded Apple create custom software 05:37.280 --> 05:40.440 to break into a terrorist's iPhone. 05:40.820 --> 05:44.140 And Apple flat out refused arguing that creating 05:44.140 --> 05:49.020 such a tool would actually establish a dangerous precedent in general. 05:49.440 --> 05:50.840 I absolutely agree with that. 05:51.020 --> 05:54.360 And undermine global security at the same time. 05:54.480 --> 05:57.880 And the FBI eventually did find a third party hacking firm 05:57.880 --> 06:00.040 to supposedly break the encryption, 06:00.340 --> 06:04.740 but the legal precedent remained unsettled in actuality. 06:04.740 --> 06:08.680 And the UK demand represented an escalation beyond 06:08.680 --> 06:11.760 even the San Bernardino one that we just talked about, 06:11.920 --> 06:14.840 where the FBI wanted to access like that one specific device. 06:15.180 --> 06:19.060 The UK demanded a permanent backdoor access 06:19.060 --> 06:23.100 to cloud services used by hundreds of millions of people. 06:23.360 --> 06:26.760 They wanted to normalize government mandated 06:27.300 --> 06:29.860 vulnerabilities that were being made, 06:29.860 --> 06:35.320 essentially be manufactured in this civilian encryption infrastructure. 06:35.820 --> 06:38.200 And as weird as it sounds, American intervention 06:38.200 --> 06:43.540 actually proved decisive in actually stopping this overreach, right? 06:43.860 --> 06:47.700 So the US National Director of Intelligence here in the US, 06:47.960 --> 06:52.260 Tulsi Gabbard actually confirmed that the Trump administration 06:52.260 --> 06:56.700 directly pressured the UK government to abandon the mandate. 06:56.700 --> 07:00.620 And Gabbard stated that protecting American citizens and crypto data 07:00.620 --> 07:04.740 became a priority for US intelligence leadership 07:05.280 --> 07:10.100 with Trump himself reportedly comparing the UK demand 07:10.720 --> 07:14.240 to surveillance tactics that are actively used by China. 07:14.720 --> 07:20.240 Now, while that is true, I'd also point out that here in the US, 07:21.120 --> 07:24.400 the government also regularly seeks to 07:24.400 --> 07:27.180 erode our privacy rights as well. 07:29.120 --> 07:31.700 I have to like completely reset here. 07:32.180 --> 07:36.400 This is supposed to be like a positive we one kind of video 07:36.400 --> 07:39.100 and I'm completely going off track with it. 07:39.160 --> 07:43.520 The US and the UK both share really extensive intelligence 07:43.520 --> 07:45.580 under agreements like Five Eyes, 07:45.840 --> 07:49.880 but American officials recognized that allowing the UK 07:50.460 --> 07:56.280 to weaken Apple's encryption would compromise American users' privacy as well. 07:56.560 --> 07:59.300 We should definitely not be so short-sighted 07:59.300 --> 08:04.020 as to believe that this was all done for our benefit or our security 08:04.020 --> 08:05.120 or they care about us. 08:05.440 --> 08:09.060 That is idiotic at best, right? 08:09.540 --> 08:11.980 But this created a rare instance where 08:12.720 --> 08:16.840 US intelligence agencies actually prioritized 08:17.720 --> 08:20.740 civilian privacy over extended surveillance capabilities 08:21.480 --> 08:23.980 probably because it would have messed with them, right? 08:24.120 --> 08:28.040 Again, they're not doing any of this to look out for us 08:28.040 --> 08:30.920 or to have our back or anything along those lines. 08:31.280 --> 08:32.860 Like, I can't, I'll stop my head. 08:32.920 --> 08:34.320 You're really going to think of an example 08:34.320 --> 08:39.980 where the US intelligence agencies have tried to advocate for user privacy. 08:40.140 --> 08:42.420 It seems more like an anathema to them. 08:42.420 --> 08:47.680 Like, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Andy Biggs 08:47.680 --> 08:52.420 had written to Gabbard warning that UK backdoor demands 08:52.420 --> 08:55.860 constituted effectively a foreign cyber attack 08:55.860 --> 08:57.960 waged through political means. 08:58.240 --> 09:02.400 They argued that if Apple built backdoors for the UK, 09:02.740 --> 09:06.520 those same vulnerabilities would exist in American phones, 09:07.000 --> 09:09.060 in our tablets, and in the computers, 09:09.060 --> 09:12.920 undermining the security of federal, state, 09:13.220 --> 09:17.340 and local government agencies that actually rely on Apple products. 09:17.620 --> 09:21.600 And at that point, they weren't advocating for you and me. 09:21.780 --> 09:25.840 They were advocating for those local, state, and federal agencies 09:25.840 --> 09:28.860 even though they are meant to represent us. 09:29.220 --> 09:31.320 That's who they were actually thinking about 09:31.320 --> 09:32.300 when they wrote these letters. 09:32.720 --> 09:34.940 The fact that they had to explain this 09:34.940 --> 09:38.520 to the US director of national intelligence, 09:39.770 --> 09:45.780 in my opinion, is kind of telling, but whatever, right? 09:46.380 --> 09:50.520 Anyone can tell you that encryption doesn't work 09:50.520 --> 09:53.160 through geographical boundaries, right? 09:53.880 --> 09:58.780 Like, your PGP isn't contingent on if you're in XYZ country. 09:59.460 --> 10:03.680 And intelligence agencies understand this perfectly well, 10:03.680 --> 10:06.720 considering the fact they do a lot of exploitation. 10:07.100 --> 10:12.900 Snowden basically showed that the NSA and GCHQ 10:12.900 --> 10:15.260 deliberately targeted encryption systems 10:15.260 --> 10:19.780 because breaking them once provided access to vast amounts 10:19.780 --> 10:21.960 of civilian communications. 10:22.400 --> 10:26.840 And the UK demand followed this exact same logic 10:26.840 --> 10:27.980 that we've seen in the past, 10:28.120 --> 10:31.380 which is force one company to weaken their protection, 10:31.380 --> 10:36.380 then exploit that weakness for something like mass surveillance 10:37.060 --> 10:38.300 disguised as protection. 10:38.620 --> 10:43.300 And once the first company does it, it starts a trend, right? 10:43.440 --> 10:46.520 And starting with Apple kind of would have been 10:46.520 --> 10:50.660 a great running start for that specific surveillance state. 10:50.940 --> 10:54.940 Meta and Google said that they received no requests 10:54.940 --> 10:59.140 and similar backdoor demands from the UK authorities. 10:59.140 --> 11:02.920 And I have to wonder if that's because they already 11:03.680 --> 11:07.440 get all the user data just by acting like an advertiser 11:07.440 --> 11:11.180 and paying those companies for it, that makes sense to me. 11:11.300 --> 11:14.760 If we give Meta and Google the benefit of the doubt, though, 11:16.700 --> 11:19.620 which is stupid, but let's just do that. 11:19.840 --> 11:24.120 We can hypothetically then say that this suggests 11:24.120 --> 11:26.780 that the government targeted Apple specifically, 11:27.660 --> 11:30.620 possibly because iCloud's advanced data protection 11:30.620 --> 11:34.400 was among some of the strongest consumer encryption 11:34.940 --> 11:38.000 that's available by forcing Apple to weaken 11:38.000 --> 11:40.540 this protection of feds across the pond 11:40.540 --> 11:44.180 would have essentially eliminated one of the highest standards 11:44.180 --> 11:49.120 of privacy protection that's used by mainstream consumers. 11:49.360 --> 11:51.240 And that last part was very important. 11:51.340 --> 11:55.520 The Investigatory Powers Act contains the legal framework 11:55.520 --> 11:58.260 for this type of coercion. 11:58.500 --> 12:01.260 The law requires companies to notify the government 12:01.260 --> 12:05.500 about new security features before deployment. 12:06.000 --> 12:08.600 And that gives the government an ample opportunity 12:08.600 --> 12:13.520 to demand modifications or block the implementation entirely. 12:13.900 --> 12:20.100 And this represents a really premeditated, prior restraint 12:20.770 --> 12:24.960 on privacy innovation in general, where government approval 12:24.960 --> 12:28.900 becomes necessary before companies can actually strengthen 12:28.900 --> 12:31.620 their products or strengthen user protection. 12:32.040 --> 12:35.540 Ian, Section 253 of the Act specifically empowers 12:35.540 --> 12:40.480 governmental entities and agents to issue technical capability 12:40.480 --> 12:44.500 notices requiring companies to remove encryption 12:44.500 --> 12:46.920 or install surveillance capabilities. 12:47.320 --> 12:51.520 These demands can target foreign companies operating in the UK 12:51.520 --> 12:56.020 as long as they provide services to British users. 12:56.640 --> 12:59.900 The law deliberately constructs a global reach 12:59.900 --> 13:01.640 for British surveillance demands. 13:02.240 --> 13:04.100 And people have been talking about this 13:04.100 --> 13:07.380 since the Act's passage in 2016. 13:07.800 --> 13:10.580 The technical capabilities notices could be used 13:10.580 --> 13:12.420 to actually undermine encryption globally, 13:12.880 --> 13:14.880 not just within the UK borders, 13:15.180 --> 13:18.000 which is kind of the whole point of all this. 13:18.000 --> 13:21.780 The Act also expanded bulk surveillance capabilities, 13:22.060 --> 13:25.740 allowing the government to collect internet connection records 13:25.740 --> 13:27.580 for the entire population. 13:27.720 --> 13:31.620 Metadata surveillance combined with backdoor access 13:31.620 --> 13:35.980 to encrypted communications really would have created a perfect storm. 13:36.200 --> 13:40.280 Comprehensive monitoring infrastructure, so to speak, 13:40.880 --> 13:44.080 comparable to authoritarian surveillance states. 13:44.080 --> 13:48.000 Now, government officials constantly dismiss these concerns 13:48.000 --> 13:49.520 during legislative debates. 13:49.740 --> 13:52.420 Of course, they would absolutely make sense. 13:52.560 --> 13:55.300 Like, if you want more power, why actually acknowledge 13:56.380 --> 13:59.460 that you could become a tyrant with said power? 13:59.860 --> 14:03.040 So instead, they just claimed that the safeguards 14:03.040 --> 14:06.220 would prevent abuse and that surveillance powers 14:06.220 --> 14:10.220 would only target legitimate security threats. 14:10.700 --> 14:13.560 Who's deeming what a security threat is? 14:13.560 --> 14:15.940 It absolutely makes no sense 14:15.940 --> 14:19.240 if you have an IQ of room temperature, right? 14:19.520 --> 14:21.920 The Apple backdoor demand really demonstrates 14:21.920 --> 14:25.820 how quickly those kind of assurances of like, 14:25.900 --> 14:28.660 oh, there won't be neighbors really prove worthless 14:28.660 --> 14:31.500 when the government's gain legal tools 14:31.500 --> 14:33.500 for coercing compliance. 14:33.880 --> 14:37.100 Apple's resistance strategy was really effective 14:37.100 --> 14:40.700 because it basically imposed real costs 14:40.700 --> 14:43.680 on the UK government by disabling 14:43.680 --> 14:46.660 advanced data protection for British users 14:46.660 --> 14:48.620 instead of putting a backdoor in it. 14:48.980 --> 14:51.680 So Apple basically made this surveillance demand 14:51.680 --> 14:54.840 visible to the public by actually doing this. 14:54.940 --> 14:57.380 British iPhone users had suddenly lost access 14:57.380 --> 14:59.760 to the strongest encryption protections, 15:00.120 --> 15:03.640 which obviously created immediate awareness 15:03.640 --> 15:05.700 of governmental actions 15:05.700 --> 15:07.980 that would have otherwise remained secret. 15:07.980 --> 15:11.520 And like this is kind of a boss move on their part, 15:11.560 --> 15:14.980 in my opinion, like good deeds are done in the light, right? 15:15.180 --> 15:17.880 So this kind of transparency really forced 15:17.880 --> 15:22.440 political accountability and the UK government found itself 15:22.440 --> 15:25.140 kind of explaining why British citizens 15:25.140 --> 15:27.740 deserved weaker privacy protection 15:27.740 --> 15:30.440 than other users in other countries. 15:30.640 --> 15:32.660 And media coverage really highlighted 15:32.660 --> 15:36.020 kind of the global security implications, 15:36.020 --> 15:39.160 which made it difficult to try and frame them 15:39.160 --> 15:41.540 as demands that were just trying to 15:42.770 --> 15:44.680 save you from the evil terrorists 15:44.680 --> 15:48.140 and focused only on British law 15:48.140 --> 15:51.600 and the needs of law enforcement there. 15:51.960 --> 15:56.520 The legal challenge through the investigatory powers 15:56.520 --> 15:58.860 tribunal added another pressure point. 15:59.420 --> 16:01.520 Apple's appeal forced the government 16:01.520 --> 16:04.340 to defend their demand in proceedings 16:04.340 --> 16:06.520 that despite secrecy attempts, 16:06.740 --> 16:10.580 generated public documentation of the surveillance overreach. 16:10.740 --> 16:14.560 It would be great to see some of these ridiculous laws 16:14.560 --> 16:17.000 and acts that have been enabled 16:17.000 --> 16:20.300 have people move to actually abolish them as well 16:20.300 --> 16:23.040 with this kind of momentum that it exists right now. 16:23.520 --> 16:24.900 And again, like we established, 16:25.080 --> 16:27.960 like this wasn't about the American users, right? 16:28.260 --> 16:29.940 Like that's the narrative. 16:30.240 --> 16:32.960 Apple's willingness to disable services 16:32.960 --> 16:34.960 rather than build back doors 16:34.960 --> 16:37.840 combined with the US government's intervention 16:37.840 --> 16:39.800 really created a perfect storm 16:39.800 --> 16:44.980 and sufficient pressure to force the UK's humiliating U-turn, 16:45.140 --> 16:46.540 which is what has been dubbed. 16:47.200 --> 16:50.740 So this victory really kind of establishes 16:50.740 --> 16:54.800 important precedents for future encryption battles 16:54.800 --> 16:56.120 that I'm sure we'll see. 16:56.620 --> 16:58.080 It shows that tech companies 16:58.080 --> 17:01.220 can successfully resist backdoor demands 17:01.220 --> 17:04.540 by making the cost of actually imposing it 17:04.540 --> 17:08.320 have real consequences on the governmental policies 17:08.320 --> 17:10.920 and the governments that are trying to impose it. 17:10.960 --> 17:13.980 It also demonstrates that international pressure 17:13.980 --> 17:16.440 can be effective when surveillance demands 17:16.440 --> 17:20.280 actually affect users across a bunch of different borders. 17:20.700 --> 17:23.640 But again, like one thing we should not get twisted is like 17:24.180 --> 17:29.180 this is not something that was done for your or my benefit, right? 17:29.180 --> 17:33.880 This was done for the God level people, right? 17:34.060 --> 17:36.040 The ones who can commit federal crimes 17:36.040 --> 17:37.400 and not get charged for it. 17:37.400 --> 17:41.120 So this is bigger than just this specific case, right? 17:41.320 --> 17:43.120 Governments worldwide have been watching 17:43.120 --> 17:45.520 to see whether Apple would actually buckle 17:45.520 --> 17:49.700 and comply with the UK backdoor demands 17:49.700 --> 17:52.680 and success would have absolutely encouraged 17:52.680 --> 17:55.480 similar mandates from other countries 17:55.480 --> 18:00.180 creating a race to the bottom, so to speak, 18:00.360 --> 18:03.180 in kind of a global encryption standards. 18:03.580 --> 18:06.880 And this defeat really sends kind of the opposite message 18:06.880 --> 18:11.440 that backdoor demands will face determined resistance. 18:11.760 --> 18:14.940 And more importantly, that if you're in politics, 18:15.360 --> 18:16.540 you'll get bad PR. 18:16.940 --> 18:20.260 Like the technical precedent that was set really matters 18:20.260 --> 18:21.520 and it matters equally. 18:21.520 --> 18:24.940 By maintaining that encryption backdoors 18:24.940 --> 18:27.580 are fundamentally incompatible with security, 18:27.960 --> 18:30.240 Apple really reinforced in concrete 18:30.820 --> 18:33.580 the cryptographic community's consensus 18:34.460 --> 18:38.020 against engineered delivery of vulnerabilities 18:38.020 --> 18:40.520 being put into the stuff that they use. 18:40.840 --> 18:42.980 The fact that there's even a debate is insane. 18:43.360 --> 18:46.020 Now the technical stance kind of becomes harder 18:46.360 --> 18:48.920 for other companies to abandon 18:49.280 --> 18:53.360 when industry leaders like Apple demonstrate 18:53.920 --> 18:56.760 its importance through costly resistance. 18:57.440 --> 19:02.220 Now the UK's Investigatory Powers Act remains fully operational. 19:02.700 --> 19:04.700 So like that's not done or destroyed. 19:05.120 --> 19:07.980 And it of course encapsulates that 19:07.980 --> 19:09.480 not the technical capability, 19:09.640 --> 19:12.120 notice powers intact with that. 19:12.340 --> 19:15.480 So they still have the ability to demand 19:15.480 --> 19:18.620 these encryption backdoors from other companies 19:18.920 --> 19:22.560 or to target different technologies with similar mandates 19:22.560 --> 19:25.700 and to see like we're starting encrypting user data 19:25.700 --> 19:30.140 and the companies have to disclose that to the UK government 19:30.140 --> 19:33.000 before they actually give users that privacy. 19:33.160 --> 19:35.480 So all this kind of invasive stuff still exists 19:35.480 --> 19:39.540 and still active, that's important to know. 19:39.700 --> 19:41.600 These attacks are going to be ongoing 19:41.600 --> 19:43.400 like and it could have already happened. 19:43.780 --> 19:45.080 Like someone could have already given it 19:45.080 --> 19:46.700 and we just don't know. 19:46.700 --> 19:49.900 And recent amendments to the act 19:49.900 --> 19:52.820 have actually expanded those surveillance powers 19:52.820 --> 19:54.260 in several areas. 19:54.700 --> 19:58.640 So the 2024 Investigatory Powers Amendment Act 19:58.640 --> 20:01.060 actually weakened some of those safeguards 20:01.060 --> 20:02.720 while giving government new tools 20:02.720 --> 20:04.860 for accessing communications data. 20:05.120 --> 20:07.920 The UK government will continue pushing 20:07.920 --> 20:09.640 for surveillance expansion 20:09.640 --> 20:12.200 despite this specific defeat. 20:12.720 --> 20:16.000 And like in turn everyone has to keep pointing out 20:16.000 --> 20:19.700 how screwed up that actually is. 20:20.220 --> 20:24.700 Like the European Union's ridiculous regulation 20:24.700 --> 20:29.560 to spy, which they've tried a hard sell 20:29.560 --> 20:32.600 on the backs of the empathetic 20:32.600 --> 20:34.680 is that it's about child safety 20:34.680 --> 20:37.720 and it includes provisions that could require 20:39.040 --> 20:41.460 chat control, which is a PC term 20:41.460 --> 20:43.360 for total spying basically. 20:43.360 --> 20:46.660 It's actually require messaging scanning 20:46.660 --> 20:48.580 for encrypted communications 20:48.580 --> 20:52.140 and Australia's Assistance and Access Act 20:52.140 --> 20:54.440 already allows their government 20:54.440 --> 20:57.280 to demand technical assistance from companies 20:57.280 --> 20:59.760 including potential backdoor installations. 21:00.280 --> 21:03.520 So the kind of global trend that's really creepy 21:03.520 --> 21:05.220 that we're seeing right now 21:05.220 --> 21:07.080 towards surveillance legislation 21:07.080 --> 21:10.360 means this UK victory represents one battle 21:10.360 --> 21:11.660 in a much larger war. 21:11.660 --> 21:15.600 Like privacy protection requires sustained resistance 21:15.600 --> 21:18.760 across multiple jurisdictions and technologies. 21:19.000 --> 21:21.260 Governments learn from each attempt 21:21.260 --> 21:25.040 adapting their kind of legal strategies 21:25.040 --> 21:27.180 and creepy methodologies 21:27.180 --> 21:29.240 and technical demands basically 21:29.240 --> 21:32.100 based on previous success and failures. 21:32.540 --> 21:35.320 And we see like the stupid ID requirements now 21:35.320 --> 21:37.080 hitting the shelves in other countries 21:37.080 --> 21:39.800 and the technology companies face 21:39.800 --> 21:43.000 increasing pressure to choose between compliance 21:43.500 --> 21:45.060 with surveillance demands 21:45.060 --> 21:47.660 and protection of user privacy. 21:48.340 --> 21:50.780 Apple's resistance in this case 21:52.120 --> 21:53.440 really kind of demonstrates 21:53.440 --> 21:57.540 that principled opposition can succeed 21:57.540 --> 21:59.340 but it requires willingness 21:59.340 --> 22:02.920 to really accept a significant business cost 22:02.920 --> 22:04.780 and legal risks. 22:05.100 --> 22:06.620 But the most important lesson 22:06.620 --> 22:08.960 from this victory that's what it is 22:09.800 --> 22:11.160 is that resistance works. 22:11.720 --> 22:13.200 Like the devious mentality 22:13.600 --> 22:14.900 that I think a lot of people have 22:14.900 --> 22:15.940 is really uncalled for. 22:16.520 --> 22:18.260 Government surveillance expansion 22:18.860 --> 22:20.160 is not inevitable 22:20.160 --> 22:22.060 and privacy is possible 22:22.440 --> 22:24.120 but only with a lot of effort. 22:24.500 --> 22:27.320 Like when corporations refuse to comply 22:27.920 --> 22:30.440 when users demand privacy protection 22:30.440 --> 22:33.680 and when diplomatic pressure reinforces 22:33.680 --> 22:36.580 those kind of technical resistance 22:36.580 --> 22:38.240 that already exists 22:38.240 --> 22:41.480 it undermines the surround state's will 22:41.880 --> 22:43.760 and they as we saw in this 22:43.760 --> 22:45.680 retreat from that overreach 22:45.680 --> 22:46.140 and they should. 22:47.640 --> 22:49.660 It's like reaching across a fire 22:49.660 --> 22:50.340 and getting burnt 22:50.340 --> 22:51.380 and you pull your hand back. 22:51.760 --> 22:52.600 It's just what it is. 22:52.740 --> 22:53.840 It's a natural reaction. 22:54.900 --> 22:56.480 Now I will say like 22:56.480 --> 22:59.060 if I didn't already use Graphino S 22:59.060 --> 23:01.380 this move would give me a 23:02.040 --> 23:03.360 ton of inspiration 23:03.940 --> 23:05.220 to actually change over 23:05.220 --> 23:07.640 but Graphino S is the go man. 23:08.200 --> 23:11.060 I do hope to see people build 23:11.060 --> 23:11.980 on this momentum 23:11.980 --> 23:14.060 if they want to go with support 23:14.060 --> 23:15.320 companies that actually 23:15.320 --> 23:17.120 resist surveillance demands 23:17.120 --> 23:18.840 that oppose legislation 23:18.840 --> 23:20.840 that mandates crazy stuff 23:20.840 --> 23:22.140 like encryption backdoors 23:22.140 --> 23:24.300 and mandates technical solutions 23:24.300 --> 23:27.120 that preserve user privacy 23:27.120 --> 23:27.900 in the end. 23:28.260 --> 23:30.720 Basically I think that's a big W for them. 23:31.780 --> 23:32.580 The surveillance apparatus 23:32.580 --> 23:34.400 will definitely regroup 23:34.400 --> 23:35.880 and try a different approach 23:35.880 --> 23:38.540 and that's just kind of what it does 23:38.540 --> 23:40.760 like they'll target other companies 23:40.760 --> 23:42.160 and other technologies 23:42.160 --> 23:44.880 and use other legal frameworks 23:44.880 --> 23:46.620 and in fact they probably already have. 23:46.960 --> 23:48.700 Every government that considered 23:48.700 --> 23:50.440 similar backdoor demands 23:50.940 --> 23:52.940 just watched the UK government 23:53.720 --> 23:55.240 basically get kicked to the teeth 23:55.240 --> 23:57.720 and forced into a humiliating retreat. 23:58.280 --> 24:00.340 Every tech company now has a blueprint 24:00.340 --> 24:01.460 for resistance. 24:01.780 --> 24:03.400 Now if they actually use it 24:03.400 --> 24:04.320 as a totally different thing 24:04.320 --> 24:06.640 but consumers can ultimately choose 24:06.640 --> 24:09.240 their fate and this again 24:09.240 --> 24:11.060 this is far from the end of this war 24:11.060 --> 24:14.060 like it's just confirmation that 24:14.840 --> 24:17.020 we can actually win against them. 24:17.200 --> 24:18.120 Thank you for watching to the end 24:18.120 --> 24:19.900 as always I'll see you in the next video.